Litigating Same-Sex Marriage: Might the Courts Actually Be Bastions of Rationality? by Gerstmann, Evan
Digital Commons@
Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School
Political Science Faculty Works Political Science
4-1-2005
Litigating Same-Sex Marriage: Might the Courts
Actually Be Bastions of Rationality?
Evan Gerstmann
Loyola Marymount University, egerstma@lmu.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Repository Citation




Gerstmann, Evan. 2005. "Litigating Same-Sex Marriage: Might the Courts Actually Be Bastions of Rationality?" PS-Political Science &
Politics 38(2):217-220.
Litigating Same-Sex Marriage: Might 
the Courts Actually Be Bastions 
of Rationality? 
The great political philosopher John Stuart 
Mill once asked, "Was there any domina- 
tion which did not appear natural to those that 
possessed it?" (Mill 1984, 269-270). For 
same-sex couples seeking access to the institu- 
tion of marriage, the public sense that mar- 
riage is naturally and obviously meant only 
for opposite-sex couples has been a formida- 
ble barrier. The first state supreme courts to 
rule on same-sex marriage, in the early 1970s, 
simply relied upon dictionary definitions to 
hold that marriage was obviously a heterosex- 
ual institution.! Politicians mostly ignored the 
issue altogether until the courts of Hawaii, 
Vermont, and Massachusetts forced public 
debate of the issue. 
Over the past several years, things have 
changed. In this brief article, I argue that 
there has been a serious divergence in how 
the courts and non-judicial political figures 
have engaged the issue of same-sex marriage, 
with the courts well out in front in terms of 
moving past the re- 
flexive notion that 
marriage simply has 
to be opposite-sex. 
There is a lively 
debate about whether 
courts are primarily 
interpreters of law or operate mainly as insti- 
tutions through which judges follow their pol- 
icy preferences (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1999; 
Gillman 2001; Volokh 2001). Certainly, this 
article will not resolve that debate. Nonethe- 
less, it is instructive to compare the reaction 
of the public and non-judicial politicians to 
that of the courts in response to the increas- 
ingly urgent pressing by same-sex couples for 
legal recognition of their relationships. While 
the public and elected officials have felt free 
to continue the mantra that exclusion of same- 
sex couples from marriage is obviously right, 
courts have moved past their initial dismissive- 
ness and are more rigorously engaging this is- 
sue. 
Courts, unlike the public, legislators, or 
executive officials, are obliged to actually 
consider and respond to facts and arguments 
presented by the gay and lesbian advocates. 
Further, courts must publicly set out the rea- 
sons for their decisions in writing. As a result, 
the courts have been bastions of rationality in 
dealing with same-sex marriage, as compared 
to other governmental actors, outside of a 
small number of enclaves such as San 
Francisco. So far, two state high courts, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii, have held that 
same-sex couples are legally entitled to get 
married, and the Supreme Court of Vermont 
has held that same-sex couples are entitled to 
all the legal rights of marriage.2 What has 
been less commented upon is that even some 
appellate courts from "red states" have en- 
gaged the question of same-sex marriage 
much more seriously than other government 
officials and they have struggled to give a 
cogent explanation for excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage. In the most recent 
case, an Indiana appellate decision rendered in 
January 2005, the same-sex plaintiffs did not 
prevail, but the courts in these cases conceded 
them a great deal of ground, and ultimately 
based their decisions on grounds wide open to 
critical dissection in future litigation. 
This is not to say that victory for same-sex 
plaintiffs is inevitable. As noted, not only do 
many believe that judges pursue their own 
policy preferences, but there is widespread 
disagreement about whether courts can or 
should rule for same-sex marriage rights given 
their institutional limitations, their counter- 
majoritarian role, and the possibility of violent 
backlash, among other reasons (see, e.g., 
Sunstein 1994). Nonetheless, I argue here that 
the grounds upon which courts are now distin- 
guishing between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples, i.e., the capacity to reproduce by ac- 
cident, is ultimately so narrow that the courts 
will have to abandon this line of reasoning, 
promising at least the possibility of future 
victory for same-sex plaintiffs. 
Unlike the courts, public officials do not 
need to defend their positions on issues in 
any sort of rigorous analytic manner. During 
his presidential run, John Kerry frequently 
averred that he opposed same-sex marriage, 
but never explained his position beyond say- 
ing, "I personally believe that marriage is 
between a man and a woman."3 Even Senator 
Hillary Rodham Clinton has not gone beyond 
the argument that marriage is only for 
opposite-sex couples because that is the way 
things have always been. In January 2000, 
she said, "Marriage has got historic, religious, 
and moral content that goes back to the be- 
ginning of time, and I think a marriage is as 
a marriage has always been: between a man 
and a woman."4 
By contrast, the courts have addressed this 
issue far more substantially. In Lawrence v. 
Texas (2003), while striking the sodomy laws 
of Texas, the Supreme Court cautioned against 
sweeping and simplistic accounts of history, 
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and asserted that history and tradition are only the beginning 
points of any discussion of the basic rights of human beings. 
The Court did not specifically address the issue of same-sex 
marriage; instead it simply noted that the case "does not in- 
volve whether the government must give formal recognition to 
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." In 
dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court's decision in 
Lawrence "leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples." 
Indeed, now that Lawrence has done away with sodomy 
laws, it is not at all clear why same-sex couples should be 
barred from marriage. As noted, this has not affected the rhet- 
oric of public officials who still see no need to explain their 
opposition to same-sex marriage. The courts, however, have 
been obliged to give more thoughtful answers to the question 
of why only opposite-sex couple may wed. Since Lawrence, 
two appellate courts, one in Arizona and one in Indiana, have 
issued opinions on same-sex marriage. Both courts, relying on 
similar reasoning, denied the same-sex petitioners' claims for 
relief. This article focuses on the recent Indiana case, 
Morrison v. Sadler. 
The Morrison court began by noting that, after Lawrence, 
moral disapproval of same-sex relationships as a constitutional 
basis for denying the right to marry was no longer tenable, 
despite the urgings of amicus groups such as Catholics Allied 
for the Faith. Nor did the court resort to the simplistic 
dictionary-based arguments that marriage was opposite sex "by 
definition." With these arguments discarded or abandoned, the 
Indiana court focused on the same issue as the Arizona court: 
the inability of same-sex couples to bear children via sexual 
intercourse. I argue that if the same-sex marriage ban rests on 
this argument, then it rests on very thin ground indeed, and 
that the courts have had to grow quite narrow in focus in 
order to sustain it. 
I have argued extensively elsewhere (Gerstmann 2003) that 
while the governmental interest in the well-being of children is 
strong, there is no logical relationship between the same-sex 
marriage ban and children's well-being, even if one accepts 
the argument that opposite-sex couples are inherently better 
parents than same-sex couples. In fact, the Indiana court did 
not give credence to this argument, saying that "we accept that 
there are a growing number of studies indicating that same-sex 
couples are at least as successful at raising children as oppo- 
site-sex couples." Instead, the court merely stated that it was a 
legislative task to make such a determination. 
Nonetheless, even deferring to the legislature on this issue, 
there is still no logical connection between banning same-sex 
marriage and maximizing the chances that children will be 
brought up by opposite-sex, married parents. The actual effect 
of the ban is to bar children already being raised in same-sex 
households from the protection afforded by the benefits of 
marriage. Further, this has the irrational effect of punishing 
children for the "sins" of their parents. Even if we assume 
that gays and lesbians are wrong to live with a same-sex part- 
ner, this is obviously not the moral responsibility of the child. 
Long ago, in Levy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court struck 
down as irrational a law that prevented an illegitimate child 
from suing for wrongful death when the child's mother was 
killed. The justices held that it is irrational to punish a child 
for the perceived sins of the parent. Likewise, it is irrational 
to punish the children of same-sex couples by denying them 
the legal rights they would have if same-sex marriage were 
legal. 
Furthermore, if marriage is primarily about providing a 
stable environment for children, then the current rules on 
who may marry and who may not are poorly suited to this 
purpose. After all, opposite-sex couples are allowed to marry 
whether or not they intend to, or are capable of, having 
children. Some courts, including the Arizona court, have 
said that inquiries into the willingness or capacity of 
opposite-sex couples to bear children would violate their 
privacy. This is a difficult argument to sustain. First of all, 
there are some groups, such as, for example, very elderly 
women, who cannot bear children. Yet, it is inconceivable 
that any legislator who wished to keep his or her job would 
argue that, say, because their reproductive years are over 
women over the age of 80 should be banned from marriage 
and the legal and financial benefits it affords. Such a ban 
would not necessarily violate the constitutional doctrine of 
equal protection (the government is allowed to treat men 
and women differently when there are real differences in 
their situation), but would no doubt be seen as cruel and 
pointless. Why is it any less so when same-sex couples are 
banned from marriage for this reason? 
The Indiana court dealt with this argument, in part, by not- 
ing that the legislation is not to be overturned "merely because 
it is not framed with such mathematical nicety as to include 
all within the reason for the classification and to exclude all 
others." This is a well-known principle of law, but linking 
opposite-sex status to child-rearing lacks more than "mathe- 
matical nicety." While 46% of married opposite-sex couples 
are raising children under the age of 18 in their home, same- 
sex couples are not far behind; 34% of lesbian couples and 
22% of male same-sex couples are raising children under the 
age of 18 in their home (Simmons and O'Connell 2003). 
These numbers would likely be even closer if same-sex cou- 
ples could marry and we were comparing married opposite-sex 
couples to married same-sex couples. Far from merely reflect- 
ing differences, the law is, at least in part, creating statistical 
differences by forbidding marriage to opposite-sex couples 
who would like to create a more stable environment for their 
children. 
The categories of "child-raisers" and "opposite-sex couples" 
overlap poorly, not only because it is true that many opposite 
sex-couples cannot or will not have children, but also because, 
as the above figures illustrate, a great many same-sex couples 
do have children, either by adoption, reproductive technology, 
or from prior opposite-sex relationships or encounters. The 
same-sex marriage ban denies children living in same-sex 
households, some 2-8 million in number (Patterson 1995, 
262), the benefits and protections of having married parents. 
The Indiana court had difficulty justifying a same-sex mar- 
riage ban on the inability to procreate as a rational policy, 
yet had to somehow distinguish between opposite-sex and 
same-sex parents. The court began by noting that, while sex- 
ual intercourse can quickly, unexpectedly, and cheaply result 
in a pregnancy, artificial methods of reproduction, and also 
adoption, are time-consuming and expensive: 
Likewise, the Plaintiffs essentially contend, it actually would 
further the State's interests in marriage and the strengthening of 
families to allow same-sex couples to raise families within the 
institution of marriage. This argument does not recognize the 
key difference between how most opposite-sex couples become 
parents, through sexual intercourse, and how all same-sex cou- 
ples must become parents, through adoption or assisted repro- 
duction. Becoming a parent by using "artificial" reproduction 
methods is frequently costly and time-consuming. Adopting 
children is much the same. Those persons wanting to have chil- 
dren by assisted reproduction or adoption are, by necessity, 
heavily invested, financially and emotionally, in those processes. 
Those processes also require a great deal of foresight and plan- 
ning. "Natural" procreation, on the other hand, may occur only 
between opposite-sex couples and with no foresight or 
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planning. All that is required is one instance of sexual 
intercourse with a man for a woman to become pregnant.5 
Based upon this difference between reproduction by inter- 
course and reproduction by artificial means, the Indiana court 
concluded that same-sex couples with children are actually so 
stable that they do not need the institution of marriage to 
provide a stable environment for their children: 
What does the difference between "natural" reproduction on the 
one hand and assisted reproduction and adoption on the other 
mean for constitutional purposes? It means that it impacts the 
State of Indiana's clear interest in seeing that children are 
raised in stable environments. Those persons who have invested 
the significant ime, effort, and expense associated with assisted 
reproduction or adoption may be seen as very likely to be able 
to provide such an environment, with or without the "protec- 
tions" of marriage, because of the high level of financial and 
emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a 
child or children in the first place. By contrast, procreation by 
"natural" reproduction may occur without any thought for the 
future. The State, first of all, may legitimately create the insti- 
tution of opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits accruing to 
it, in order to encourage male-female couples to procreate 
within the legitimacy and stability of a state-sanctioned rela- 
tionship and to discourage unplanned, out-of-wedlock births 
resulting from "casual" intercourse. Second, even where an 
opposite-sex couple enters into a marriage with no intention of 
having children, "accidents" do happen, or persons often 
change their minds about wanting to have children. The institu- 
tion of marriage not only encourages opposite-sex couples to 
form a relatively stable environment for the "natural" procre- 
ation of children in the first place, but it also encourages them 
to stay together and raise a child or children together if there 
is a "change in plans."6 
Although the same-sex plaintiffs lost the case, the judicial 
portrayal of same-sex couples in this case is remarkably posi- 
tive. The court acknowledged that the great weight of social 
science data indicates that "same-sex couples are at least as suc- 
cessful at raising children as are opposite-sex couples."' The 
court then asserts that same-sex couples with children are likely 
so committed to their families that their children do not have 
the same need for married parents as do children of opposite- 
sex couples who may accidentally blunder into parenthood after 
a careless sexual encounter. To say the least, this presents a 
stark contrast from the once ubiquitous image of gays and les- 
bians as promiscuous pleasure-seekers more likely to molest 
children than to nurture them in loving, stable homes.8 
It also stands in sharp contrast to much of the rhetoric 
regarding gay families coming from our nation's executive 
branch, much of which still demonstrates unreflective hostility. 
Five days after the Indiana decision, PBS announced that, un- 
der heavy pressure from the U.S. Department of Education, it 
was pulling from distribution an episode of "Postcards from 
Buster." Buster is an animated rabbit, the friend of the popular 
animated aardvark "Arthur." In the "Postcards" series he visits 
a diverse group of families, including children of single par- 
ents, children who live with their grandparents, and a family 
of fundamentalist Muslims, all without objection by the federal 
government. In fact, Buster himself is the child of divorced 
parents. Yet his visit to a Vermont family with lesbian parents 
prompted Department of Education Secretary Margaret 
Spelling to threaten PBS's federal funding, asserting that, 
"Many parents would not want their young children exposed 
to the lifestyles portrayed in the episode."9 This hostility to 
same-sex families comes from the very top of the executive 
branch, with a president who denounces judicial efforts to 
fairly engage the issue of same-sex marriage as "activism" 
dangerous to families and children. As recently as in his 
February 2, 2005, State of the Union Address, President 
George W. Bush declared: "Because marriage is a sacred 
institution and the foundation of society, it should not be rede- 
fined by activist judges. For the good of families, children and 
society, I support a constitutional amendment o protect the 
institution of marriage." Compared to this open hostility to 
same-sex marriage, and even compared to the statements of 
liberal senators such as Kerry and Clinton, the Indiana 
decision is far more thoughtful and far more laudatory of 
same-sex families. 
What of that, though? Some advocates of same-sex marriage 
might question what good comes from positive portrayals by 
the courts when the end result is a loss for the plaintiffs. I 
would argue that there are potentially two very significant ben- 
efits to this respectful judicial description of same-sex parents. 
First, as I demonstrate lsewhere (Gerstmann 1999), judicial 
rhetoric can have an important impact upon the broader politi- 
cal debate. The judicial hostility to gay and lesbian claims 
expressed in the now-overruled Bowers v. Hardwick served as 
justification for a wide array of sexual orientation-based 
discrimination, as the Court itself acknowledged when it over- 
turned that decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Further, the federal 
courts' repeated insistence that gays and lesbians do not 
deserve the same level of legal protection as groups such as 
African Americans has rendered gays and lesbians vulnerable 
to the charge that they are seeking "special rights" that they 
neither need nor deserve (Gerstmann 1999). The interplay 
between judicial decisions and politics is complex, but to the 
degree that judicial decisions affect the larger political dia- 
logue, the Indiana decision, along, of course, with Lawrence, 
puts gays and lesbians seeking equal rights on far friendlier 
grounds than have past decisions. 
Second, the Indiana decision rests on grounds wide open to 
legal attack on appeal or in litigation in other states. Most ob- 
viously, there are many same-sex families where the children 
are not the result of reproductive technology or adoption, but 
of heterosexual intercourse performed by one member of the 
couple. The Indiana court acknowledged this but avoided the 
problems it creates for the court's reasoning by relying on an 
omission in the plaintiffs' legal arguments: 
It is possible, and indeed it likely frequently happens that a 
same-sex couple may raise a child or children that one or both 
members had earlier as a result of an opposite-sex relationship. 
The Plaintiffs focus on same-sex couples who have children by 
assisted reproduction and adoption. We do likewise, focusing on 
the inability of a same-sex couple to have a child together 
within the confines of their intimate relationship.'1 
This judicial parry can easily be countered in future liti- 
gation by providing statistics on the numbers of same-sex 
couples raising children born to one member of the couple 
by ordinary reproductive means. If the heterosexual monop- 
oly on marriage rests on such slim grounds, then there is 
much reason for optimism that other courts will recognize 
the right of same-sex couples to wed. As noted, there are 
those who doubt that legal arguments and logic are impor- 
tant predictors of judicial outcomes, but for those who 
believe that legal arguments have at least some significant 
effect on judicial outcomes (see, e.g., Epstein and Kobylka 
1992), the courts' difficult struggle to differentiate between 
opposite and same-sex parents and the respective benefits of 
marriage for them, signals at least the possibility of future 
success, especially as the idea of same-sex marriage grows 
less novel over time. 
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Notes 
1. The Supreme Court of Minnesota was the first high court to rule 
against same-sex marriage (1971, Baker v. Nelson). The Kentucky 
Supreme Court followed two years later in Jones v. Hallahan. 
2. The decision of the Hawaiian court was effectively overruled by 
popular referendum before it took effect. 
3. CNN Crossfire (May 17, 2004): Transcript # 051700CN.V20. 
4. Quoted in Andrew Sullivan, "State of the Union," The New Republic 
18, 20 (May 8, 2000). 
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